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It is not well! while hate and wrong  
Are hand in hand with war and strife;  
No home secure, no heart may claim  
The blessed gifts of love and life.

Now take this chain: leave no weak link,  
But strongly forge, then forge again:  
Thrice heat the kiln with fires heaped high.  
Tho' built of hopes, and lit with pain.

With you I leave this sacred charge,  
And bid you work till war cries cease:  
One God, one land, with sister hands  
To hold the silver chain of peace.

WORCESTER, MASS.

### ANNUAL PUBLIC MEETING OF THE AMERICAN PEACE SOCIETY.

The American Peace Society held its annual public meeting in Huntington Hall, Boston, on the evening of Wednesday, May 13th. The President Mr. Robert Treat Paine called the meeting to order and prayer was offered by Rev. Reuben Thomas, D.D. Mr. Paine, before introducing President Walker as president of the evening, spoke as follows:

It is my privilege, as President of the American Peace Society, to welcome you here this evening. Boston has taken its due share in many of the great events and movements which have influenced the progress of this country, this continent, and perhaps the world. These last five months have produced an intensity of thought on this great problem of peace or war, of arbitration not surpassed at any previous period. Is it not blind folly not to recognize the stupendous danger? When two great nations are excited with passion, the firing of a cannon by a sailor on a man-of-war of either party, by accident or in malice, might ignite a flame of war which no man would know how to quickly extinguish. Nothing can guarantee the two great branches of the common brotherhood of the English-speaking people against the danger of a possible explosion of war, except some previous solemn compact, of such nature as to ensure deliberation and adequate time for passions to subside. Here in Boston and Massachusetts there are not many peace-at-any-price men; we have Bunker Hill, and the battle-fields of Lexington and Concord. But we meet to promote arbitration; and we invite an illustrious officer of the army in the late war to preside. I have the honor to introduce, as the president of the evening, General Francis A. Walker, president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

#### ADDRESS OF GEN. FRANCIS A. WALKER.

*Ladies and Gentlemen:* It gives me great pleasure to take the chair at this sixty-eighth annual meeting of the American Peace Society, of which my honored father was a life-long member, and which he represented at two international congresses abroad, in the early, hopeful days of this movement. No time could be more suitable for the renewal of an earnest agitation to promote the cause of peace among the nations. The recent outbreak of cheap and vulgar jingoism, so strikingly contrasting with the peaceful spirit of our people for the twenty years which followed the Treaty of Washington, has forced upon our minds the importance, the necessity of bringing before this generation, which has itself known

nothing of war, the considerations which make for peace. To many of us the behavior of our people from 1870 on to the Chilean incident not only furnished the bright promise, but seemed even to be a strong earnest, of a national career which should be free at once from fear and from arrogance, and which should at all times seek peace with other nations, and domestic prosperity. Consequently the quick succeeding hot flushes of anger and passionate feeling, which the last few years have witnessed, have come to us with something of surprise and shock. Yet this episode only emphasizes and enforces the lesson of history, that each generation has to be educated, for itself, in all the things which pertain to its welfare. As one who believes that peace is the greatest interest of the nations, I beg to be indulged,—before proceeding to introduce the distinguished gentlemen who are to address you this evening,—in a few practical suggestions regarding the manner in which the propaganda for international peace will most effectively be prosecuted.

In the first place, I would like to say, negatively, that it does not appear to me that our cause is to be largely promoted by preaching the doctrine of non-resistance. No one has more admiration than myself for the great Quaker protest against violence and brutality. There are few things in human history finer than the moral courage and moral enthusiasm which prompted and sustained the non-resistance movement. That movement has not been without effect; it has done good in a thousand ways; it has continued to be, and still is, a force of no small magnitude in promoting more enlightened sentiments regarding the relations of man to man. Doubtless the idea of non-resistance is destined to exert influence upon the social developments of the future; but I believe that influence is to be a continually diminishing one. The growth of biological science is hostile to its very principle; and it will fall, it seems to me, more and more out of the intellectual sympathies of mankind. The right of self-defence, both for the man and for the nation,—self-defence by the exercise of every power and faculty,—accords with the philosophy of our day; and it is not by denying the completeness of this natural right that the cause of international peace is to be promoted.

Nor, again, is it to be promoted by indiscriminate disparagement of the causes and occasions of all the wars which have taken place in the past. The strongest argument for international peace is not through trying to prove a proposition so large and doubtful as that all wars have been unnecessary and wrongful; but through proving conclusively that certain wars, many wars, might have been averted by negotiation and by the exercise of patience and the spirit of conciliation.

Again, the cause of international peace is not to be promoted by that disparagement of the soldier, which was so familiar in the early agitation of this subject, in the youthful days of the American Peace Society. All that talk about the soldier as a "butcher," of which I heard so much in my own boyhood, is both unjust and injudicious. Such danger as there is of undue laudation of the glories of war will be best offset, not by direct disparagement, but by setting more clearly and strongly forth the beneficence of peace.

And, finally, our object is not to be promoted by dwelling very much upon another favorite theme of the early writers on the subject,—the "horrors of war." When war comes to a people, as something deemed necessary to

their safety and their honor, they will take war, with all its horrors, and think very little of the latter. And those who will think least of all of the horrors of war will be those who are chiefly to endure them.

So much negatively. In what way, then, may we justly pursue our object, the promotion of international peace? I venture, with great diffidence, to suggest certain points.

First, we must do away with the false, fatalistic notion that wars come because they must; that any attempt to avert them will be futile, and that to postpone them is only to render them more bloody and costly in the end. This idea is very widely spread; it has had a great deal to do, in the minds of people and rulers alike, with promoting the peremptory and summary treatment of international disputes. Yet no popular idea was ever more completely unfounded. Of a large part of recent wars it may be confidently said that, had they only been postponed, they might have been wholly averted. The ship grazes upon the rocks, falls off again into the deep water, and pursues its voyage to the end without encountering another danger. Take the outbreak of warlike fury between England and France which preceded our own Civil War, when sixty or seventy of Napoleon's colonels addressed the emperor declaring their readiness to lead their battalions across the Channel, and England replied with the formation of rifle-clubs and the beating of the drum all over that "tight little isle." Had war then taken place, it would have furnished another supposed proof of the uselessness of attempting to avert war. It would have been declared that where national animosities are deep-seated the sooner the nations involved "have it out," squarely and frankly, the better for lasting peace. And yet in that instance the mere postponement of the issue, — one can hardly tell how, — led to the complete avoidance of the danger; and to-day one cannot say when it was the episode closed. Even in the great conflict in eastern Europe which preceded the event of which I have just spoken, — the Crimean War, — the Prime Minister of England admitted that, in his own words, the country had "drifted into war," with the intimation that, in the presence of a strong and persistent opposition, the cause of dispute might somehow have been compromised.

In the stress of unfriendly feeling from 1868 to 1870, over the Alabama claims, the most likely result at one time was that war would ensue between England and the United States. Had it been so, every cheap philosopher would ever after, to the end of time, have cited this as another instance in proof of the impracticability of averting and avoiding war. Yet the Treaty of Washington, so honorable to both nations, entirely removed the causes of dispute; and for twenty-five years the relations of the two countries remained altogether peaceful and friendly. These three instances, which I have hurriedly recited, are characteristic of the occasions of international dispute generally. It ought to be the motto of this Society that a war postponed is a war averted.

A second argument for international peace is found in the waste of resources, the arrest of peaceful industry, the interruption of all useful arts and designs, the disturbance and perversion of economic relations, the political and social corruption, the legacy of debt, vice, and misery and crime, which war necessarily involves. It is the economist and the sociologist who are to-day the strongest advocates of peace.

A third method by which this Society may rightfully and properly pursue its object is by such strong and

vehement protest as shall prevent the American pulpit from being disgraced by war-talk. I would not presume to intimate that this fault has been general on the part of the clergy throughout our land; but there has been enough of it to disgust and revolt every right-feeling man. During the agitation over the Alabama claims, to which I have already referred, the most noisy and vehement advocates of a peremptory and summary treatment of the subject were ministers of the gospel of peace. A distinguished clergyman made the tour of New England with a wild and unreasonable harangue, in which the real wrongs we had suffered at the hands of England were set forth, with a great deal of exaggeration, while the possible measures of redress were discussed in the most offensive spirit. There was, to be sure, a provision intended to save the clerical conscience: we were to talk up right sharp and were to press our claims for apology and damages without discount or delay; but of course England would not fight, and would yield everything rather than contest the matter with us, — which was perhaps the most irritating and offensive form in which the matter could be put. Was not this a pretty theme for a Christian minister to take; and was not that a pretty way in which to treat it? Yet if this lecture called out any remonstrances from the clergy of New England, or from the religious press, they do not meet my eye.

Listen, if you please, to the following choice bits of Christian philosophy and Christian morality, taken from the reported remarks of an eminent Doctor of Divinity in a Presbyterian Assembly, in New York, during the same period: "He believed that in the present state of the world war is sometimes a direct necessity, and it must be gone through with. While the American people were drunk with the crime of slavery, the rods of God's wrath were laid upon them. And he believed now, as we had taken our dose, England ought to have hers. He believed it would serve England greatly to get a good drubbing from some one."

In this city of Boston, at a convention of ministers just before the Franco-German war, an officer of this Society rose in his place and offered a resolution that the convention should join in prayer that God would avert hostilities and furnish some means of peaceful solution. This does not seem a very startling proposal to make in a body of men who profess to believe in the blessings of peace and in the efficacy of prayer. Yet it was received by the presiding officer with open and scandalous indignity. Peace was denounced in terms which sounded strangely coming from a minister of Christ's gospel; and war was lauded as one of the great agents in human progress. The poor peacemaker, anything but blessed, was morally hustled out of the convention; and victory remained with the fighting parson. That such wild, wicked and blasphemous talk has not ceased with the settlement of the Alabama claims, has been too painfully brought to our conviction by very recent events. During this last winter, when the Venezuelan question was under discussion, the telegraph flashed over the land a prayer of the chaplain of one of the two Houses of Congress, in which he besought God to "make this nation quick to resent anything like an insult." Quick to resent anything like an insult? If that be Christianity, there was great loss of good morals and good manners when Paganism went out of fashion. The minister of Christ's gospel has nothing whatever to do with the reasons which lead to war. There may be such reasons, but they do not ap-

peal to him. His duty is to present the sacred, the urgent motives which make for peace. There will be enough, and more than enough, without him who will be eager to rush on to the hostile settlement of international disputes. The considerations which should prompt to peace will be, in every case, too weakly supported and held, even if the ministers of Christ's gospel shall continue to preach good will to men. I may be as hot headed as I please, as prompt to violence, as ready to take offence; but I claim the right, as a sinful man, prone to evil, to have the minister of Christ's gospel at my side suggesting the motives of forbearance and charity; explaining away, so far as honesty may be, the occasions of dispute; and standing across my path with entreaty, persuasion and solemn warning, to prevent my wrath and wrong. In any event, I have a right to demand that it shall not be the professed servant of the Prince of Peace who talks loudest about "honor," cocks his hat the jauntiest, and is foremost with suggestions of "satisfaction."

Another matter to which, it seems to me, the friends of peace may properly give attention is in the way of sharp protest and criticism of those men in public life who seek for personal or political advantage through warlike talk and by the peremptory treatment of international questions. I have commended to the American Peace Society the Jingo Clergyman, I would also commend to its attention the Jingo Congressman. It ought to be as much as any man's political life is worth,—and, in some sections of this country, at least, it can be made as much as any man's political life is worth to make buncombe speeches regarding questions of international dispute; to refuse to refer to a committee measures which may be measures of peace or war; and to insist upon driving hostile resolutions through legislative bodies in a single day.

This long enumeration brings me to the chief of the means or agencies to which we may look, even in the immediate present, for the promotion of friendly relations with other countries; and that is Arbitration, as a means of dealing with international disputes. I have so long trespassed upon your time and attention already, that I will not utter a single word in anticipation of what the distinguished speakers of the evening are to bring to your deeply interested consideration.

I have the honor and pleasure of introducing to the Society the Reverend Dr. Edward Everett Hale.

ADDRESS OF REV. EDWARD E. HALE, D.D.

*Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen:* I wish to call to your attention the meeting of a few gentlemen, rather more than one hundred years ago, which in its outcome has a right to be regarded as the first Peace Society of modern times. I do not forget the Great Design of Henry IV. of France, Queen Elizabeth, and other leaders of their time, who proposed a permanent tribunal of peace and the pacification of Europe. But that demand of theirs had been permitted to go by, and it is on an occasion which you will think, perhaps, too small for consideration now, that the greatest peace society on the earth was born.

I suppose it to have been, indeed, at the dinner-table of President Washington,—certainly it was under the hospitable shelter of Mount Vernon, that the greatest peace society in the world was born. It was in the year 1785, two years after what had been called peace had been arranged with England. Then it had proved that

here were thirteen nations, jarring against each other, quarrelling at every point, fierce animosities existing on the right hand and on the left, and that there was no peace. A question with regard to some oysters in the Bay of Chesapeake is the beginning which has started a contest: the oystermen of Maryland and the oystermen of Virginia are in collision, and here are two sovereign States, ready for war, in order each to defend the honor of the oyster, whether of Virginia or of Maryland. And it is under those circumstances that the great nation of Virginia on one side of the Chesapeake, and the great nation of Maryland on both sides,—it is on that occasion that they invited commissioners to meet to settle the question of the oysters. And George Washington, who has lately laid down the sword, is one of these commissioners of arbitration; and as his habit was, he asked these gentlemen to stay with him as his guests in the matchless hospitality of Mount Vernon. And, as I like to imagine, it is at a dinner party after the oysters on the shell have been served from the Virginia side, after Madam Washington's magnificent *purée de huîtres* has been served from the Maryland side, after the fried oysters, gathered perhaps from both shores,—it is then that the conversation, from the question of the oysters, works itself out, as it must do where sensible people have come together, and General Washington, or one of these gentlemen, whose names I will not repeat, says, "But this is only one subject. We can settle this business of the oysters here to-night; but there are other contests between the States. There is the whole shad question from the Susquehanna above, which is going to sweep down upon us next spring; there is the question of lumber; there is the question of imports and exports on which every one of the thirteen States is at war with every other one. We must have some larger method of arranging the difficulties between us." And it is from such conversation, under the hospitable roof of Mount Vernon, that there is born the great Federal Convention of which Mr. Gladstone said that it struck out in the fewest months the greatest amount of wisdom which had ever been struck out by men brought together.

What did the Federal Convention bring about? It brought about, you say, the nation of the United States; and so it did. And how did it do it? By creating an army? No. Could it add anything to history? No. Were there any arrangements of detail which would "keep these people from cutting each other's throats a little longer"? as one of them said. You can scarcely say that. As the century has gone by, the great work of the Federal Convention, in stopping not only such petty attacks upon each other as that of the oystermen, but in preventing war, with one exception only in a century,—the great work of the Federal Convention was the establishment of the Supreme Court of the United States. A Permanent Tribunal, which should always be in session, day and night, which should have its marshals, its officers, and its established rules of procedure to determine any questions which might arise between these thirteen States,—the Supreme Court was called into existence. Supreme, remember; it has shown itself a supreme court again and again, from that day to this day. It showed itself a supreme court only in this last summer when, over the head of the President and the Congress, the Supreme Court said, "No; the income tax stops, and this money goes back to the men who have paid it." The Supreme Court is supreme over the executive, over Congress, over every

one of the forty-five States which make up the American nation. You have thus a supreme court, a Permanent Tribunal, which can sit in judgment on a question of very small importance between individuals of any two States of the United States, and which can decide State questions as well, such as have again and again sent nations into war against each other.

I would not attempt, on such an occasion as this, to go over even the names of the discussions, between sovereign States remember, which this Supreme Court, — because it is permanent, because it is supreme, — has adjudicated and settled. I am speaking to a great many Massachusetts men; I am speaking, I see, to many men and women of great intelligence; but it would be no disgrace to any persons in this room not to know that within fifty years there has been a question between the State of Rhode Island and the State of Massachusetts such as has again and again sent German States to war against each other, such as has again and again sent kings of Italy to war. And here we do not so much as know the names of the places involved in the question between Rhode Island and Massachusetts! It is rather an interesting question; I looked it up in order that I might come to this meeting; I knew nobody else would do anything about it. And I think it might be as well to say what were the causes of war.

In the beginning, Charles the First, — who had just as much right in the business as I have to adjudicate between the boundaries of Patagonia and Chile, — declared that the southern boundary of Massachusetts should run from the Atlantic to the Pacific on a line three miles south of the southernmost water of Charles River. In those early days you sent out your surveyor, and he went up in his canoe, and when he got above the canoe he worked up, though he had no rubber boots, till the brook got small and finally he said, "This point is the southernmost point of Charles River," and he puts up a stone there and ran a line east and west, and that line was accepted as the southern boundary of the State of Massachusetts. Then a couple of hundred years go by, more or less, and at the end of a century or two some man who wants to make a better map discovers another brook which will go up far enough, if you go on a rainy day, to bring the head-waters two miles farther south than the head-waters in the original survey. Excellent question to fight about, which of these is the head-water, which shall decide the southern line of the State of Massachusetts? Excellent question, — almost exactly like the question on which we are invited to fight with regard to the boundary of Venezuela at the present moment. And on that question Massachusetts and Rhode Island might have gone to war, — we did have constables arresting the wrong men because they did not pay their taxes to the right State. But the Supreme Court of the United States said, "We are supreme in this business. You may bring your maps." And they adjudicated the question, and the boundary is decided forever, and you and I do not know on which side it is decided. And this is because there is a Permanent Tribunal, a supreme tribunal, which shall arrange the disputes among the States which make up the nation which is the United States. And that nation would not exist to-day unless such a supreme tribunal had been the master-stroke of the great policy of the men who made the Federal Constitution.

My friends here are proud, and are rightly proud, that to-day they celebrate the sixty-eighth anniversary of this Society, one of the oldest, perhaps the oldest peace so-

ciety, so called, in this world. But long before their time as early as 1789, when the United States of America was founded, it became as the United-States-of-America, the greatest peace society that the sun of God has ever shone upon. The United States of America is to-day a peace society; that is what the name stands for. It is a peace society preserving peace, first among thirteen States, then among fifteen, then among twenty-four, and now at last among forty-five States from ocean to ocean.

My little parable of the oysters has extended itself longer than I meant it should. But it is not very difficult to apply the lesson of the meeting under the roof of Mount Vernon to the lesson which ought to go forth from this place to-night, from all the places where people are brought together who have to do with the government of this country. At the present moment we are interested, at any moment we ought to be interested, in the relations between England and America. Will you let me read to you a pregnant passage which I heard from the lips of its distinguished author last June, in the Sanders Theatre at Cambridge? Sir Frederick Pollock, the gentleman to whom, as the highest legal authority in England, the English government entrusted the make-up of its case in the Venezuelan matter, said in the great oration which he delivered on that day:

"There is nothing I know of in our constitution to prevent the House of Lords, if it should think fit, from desiring the judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, by some indirect process, if not directly, and as a matter of personal favor, to communicate their collective or individual opinions on any question of general law; nor, I should apprehend, can there be anything in the constitution of that most honorable court, or the office of its judges, to prevent them from acceding to such a request, if it could be done without prejudice to their regular duties. Such a proceeding could not, in any event, be common. It might happen twice or thrice in a generation, in a great and dubious case touching fundamental principles, like that of *Dalton V. Angus*, — a case in which some strong American opinions, if they could have been obtained, would have been specially valuable and instructive.

"Could the precedent be made once or twice in an informal and semi-official manner, it might safely be left to posterity to devise the means of turning a laudable occasional usage into a custom clothed with adequate form. As for the difficulties, they are of the kind that can be made to look formidable by persons unwilling to move, and can be made to vanish by active good will. Objections on the score of distance and delay would be inconsiderable, not to say frivolous. From Westminster to Washington is for our mails and despatches hardly so much of a journey as it was a century ago from Westminster to an English judge on the Northern or Western circuit. Opinions from every supreme appellate court in every English-speaking jurisdiction might now be collected within the time that Lord Eldon commonly devoted to the preliminary consideration of an appeal from the Master of the Rolls."

This is an opinion from the highest legal authority which England could name as to what is the present position of things between the nation of England and the nation of America.

I hope that some day one of our young historical painters will make for us a picture of the dinner-table at

Mount Vernon, of the half-dozen delegates assembled there, and the moment when the suggestion was made of the permanent tribunal which should make the greatest peace society in the world. If one may look into the future, a somewhat similar moment will be the moment when the Chief-Justice of the United States and the Lord High Chief-Justice of England shall meet together in a conference,—perhaps on the lives of the thirty thousand baby seals who are to starve to death within the next six months because their mothers have been slaughtered; perhaps that matter will seem of sufficient importance to two nations for them to ask the heads of their judiciary to consider whether such famine and slaughter are creditable to the civilization of the one nation and of the other. But no matter what that first question may be; perhaps it may be as to what are the head-waters of the River Otranto, whether they cross by the side of two palm-trees or by the side of three dragon-bayonet trees; whatever the question which may be referred to these two gentlemen, it might be that as they sit at lunch one of them should say to the other, “My good brother, we have become excellent friends in the course of this discussion; surely we are not going home never to see each other again? Would it not be possible for us to propose an enlargement of this thing, and to make it permanent? If you could only have, sitting at your side here, one of your coadjutors and one of mine; if we could call in,—don’t you remember that very bright Frenchman that you met in the arbitration business four years ago,—the man who spoke English so well? If we could have him there, and that fine Swiss,—and, don’t you know, those Italian fellows are working out their whole business on philosophical lines, getting ahead of us,—you might have So-and-So?” If out of this discussion about the seals or the head-waters of the Otranto there could grow up the Permanent Tribunal, of six, eight, ten, or thirteen judges, in session, with its officers, its marshals, with its right to command testimony, with its sifting over of evidence, and gradually with the prestige of the world attached to its decisions,—what a blessing that, for this twentieth century of ours to boast over!

Mr. Tennyson has written no line which has been more often quoted and more widely remembered than that fine line with which “Locksley Hall” closes, where he expresses the hope for

“The parliament of Man, the federation of the world.”

But the world has already, in the generation and more which has passed since then, got beyond its need of parliaments of peace. We have only too many parliaments now, and too many speeches. What the world wants is a Tribunal of Peace, a Permanent Tribunal; and the world is sure to have it. And all meetings to-day are looking forward to this Permanent Tribunal,—to begin, if you please, between England and America; to go farther, till the nations of Christendom are made one out of many, as the Lord Jesus prayed.

“That day is coming,” says Sir Frederick Pollock, “and every one of us can do something to hasten it; of us, I say, not only as citizens, but as especially bound thereto by the history and traditions of our profession, which belong to America no less than to England.”

That day is coming, and every one of us can do more or less to hasten it!

GEN. WALKER: One of the greatest public teachers of America has come from his home in another State to address this Society this evening on the subject of inter-

national arbitration. You have already anticipated the pleasure of hearing him: I now give you that pleasure. The Reverend Dr. Lyman Abbott.

ADDRESS OF REV. LYMAN ABBOTT, D.D.

It is difficult to know how to combat an error that is simply in the air. Like a ghost, though you run your rapier through it, it declines to fall, and remains threatening still. It is practically impossible to find a definite argument in favor of war; all the arguments are against it. It is perhaps not the only thing in respect to which the arguments are on one side and the practice of humanity on the other. There is this to be said however; that Massachusetts,—I hope this remark will not be regarded as immodest, for I am myself a Massachusetts boy,—has educated the nation; and that, speaking here in Huntington Hall, I may assume that I am speaking to men and women who are thinking for the nation. It is safe to assume that those of us who do believe in peace have some work to do in this country, and some work to do even in this honorable peace society, a hundred years old, of which Mr. Hale has just told us. It is true that the Venezuela message was only a lighted match; but the flame would not have run all over the country, from east to west and from north to south, if the inflammable material had not been there. The parable has even been illustrated, “While the good man of the house was sleeping, the enemy was sowing tares.” The remnant of the reflux wave of the Civil War; the enormous and increasing pension list; the commercial rivalry with other nations, leading us to regard them as our enemies, not as our friends; the elaborate development of a militia force in our cities and the building of great armories in the very heart and centre of them; the increasing use of the army to do duty which could better be done by the police;—these and kindred influences have so wrought on the national imagination that to-day there are all over this country, not scores nor even hundreds only, but thousands of men who really are desirous of war for the glory which it brings.

General Walker has charged the clergy with promoting the war fever. I never knew an ardent believer, who had so much faith in preachers and prayers as General Walker seems to have, since he attributes so much influence to one itinerant preacher in Massachusetts, and one prayer of one man in the House of Representatives! But whether the clergy are to blame or not, whether we are to take our share of reproach with the rest or not, it is certain that this war-spirit has unconsciously grown, and has been sedulously developed, until to-day our Congress is wasting millions of dollars on ships that, we all hope, will never fire a gun, and on coast defences that we all believe will never have occasion to resist an enemy.

Consider for one moment what this war-spirit means. It means, morally, the emergence of the tiger in man. It means the deterioration of man from the intellectual, the spiritual, the reasonable being, back to the savage not yet issued from the animalism of the forests. It means entailing upon nations an immense cost in money. It is estimated that the taxes under which the people of Europe groan may be divided into three very nearly equal portions: one portion paying the interests on war-debts, one portion keeping up present war armaments, and one portion paying the necessary expenses of pacific government. Gentlemen who are conducting business, I would like to know what you would think of your



own prosperity if one-third of your income had to go in paying debts incurred in buying pistols, and one-third in salaries to watchmen to keep your factory from burglars and your house from savages? And that is precisely the condition of things which the bellicose Senators and Representatives of our country are endeavoring to bring about in America,—a condition in which the country whose efforts have been centred on production shall be devoted to war. The difference between national wealth and national poverty lies in this. We are a rich nation; why? Partly because we are a young nation, a free nation, a nation where every man is at liberty to make the best he can of himself; partly because of our unparalleled national resources; because the hands, the brains, the thoughts, the energies, which abroad have been expended either in war or in preparation for war, that is in destruction or preparation for destruction, have been in this country expended in production. But war involves not a cost in money only, it is a cost in blood, in tears, in men, in women, absolutely impossible to estimate, impossible for anyone not a dramatic orator even for an instant to portray. A cost in moral character, too; for who can measure the development of passion, wrath, bitterness, hot anger, “set on fire of hell,” by a great war? Its perils to freedom are attested by the long record of human history. Let any advocate of a military establishment turn, if he can, to the history of a single nation which has preserved free institutions while burdened by a great standing army. It cannot be done. The men who to-day in America are stirring up bad blood, getting themselves ready for war and prating about the glories of it, are a greater peril to American liberty and institutions than Germany, France, Italy, Spain and England all combined!

But war brings glory? Yes, it does; there is real glory in war. It is idle for us to shut our eyes to it or to deny it. There is a glory of heroism, a glory of self-sacrifice, a glory of cross-bearing, in a noble war,—aye, and in many a war which is ignoble, for God of His great goodness, brings something good out of the heart of evil. But the answer to that cry for the glory of war was made, in terms more eloquent than I can repeat, by your own Mr. Everett here in Boston last summer. There is glory in a time of pestilence,—the glory of the physician, the glory of the nurses. Will you then import into Boston the yellow fever, that you may have the glory of the noble self-sacrificing women nursing the sick? There is glory in the deeds of the fireman, when he runs up the ladder and in his strong arms seizes and brings back to safety the mother or the child; will you then touch your torch to the buildings of Boston and start a great conflagration, that you may have the glory of the fireman? The grandeur of a nation,—that does not need to be said in Boston because, more than half a century ago it was said and Boston has ever since heard the echoes of Charles Sumner's words,—does not lie in its use of brute force, but in its abstention from a force which it might use, and the employment of it to a nobler purpose. There is more glory in production than in destruction; there is more glory in an axe or a hammer than in a sword; more glory in the plain, useful, productive factory than in a score of battle-ships planned for destruction.

War, which costs so much in money, costs so much in character, costs so much in life, costs so much in peril to institutions,—what does it for us? If we may trust the telegraph,—I have had some experience in being misre-

ported, and I do not venture to say that Archbishop Ireland is truly reported,—Archbishop Ireland says war is necessary for the development of patriotism. As General Walker said to me just before we came in here, “I thought men fought for their country because they loved it; it seems now that they can love their country only because they have fought for it.” This is a curious inversion of the order of morals. War necessary to develop patriotism! Again I say, out of the greatest evil God brings forth good, and even out of the camp of hate God sometimes evolves love. But this is strange doctrine, that we cannot love our neighbor unless we hate our enemy. This is a new translation of the Sermon on the Mount: “It hath been said by them of old time, Thou shalt love thy neighbor and hate thine enemy; but I say unto you, You cannot love your neighbor unless you hate your enemy.” Is it then not possible for Archbishop Ireland to be a patriotic American unless he is permitted to lead an Irish regiment against Great Britain? Is it not possible for Carl Schurz to be a patriotic American, unless he may plunge his stiletto into the heart of Germany? Does love suckle itself at the breast of hatred?

War! what is it? It is not mere chance quarrelling. War is the acknowledged, recognized method of settling controversies between nations. It is a part of international law. There are international rules of war which cannot be disregarded; war itself is brought under the law of a higher public opinion, and must be carried on in accordance with that law. It is not so long ago that battle was the recognized method of settling controversies between individuals; this method was known as “wager of battle.” Two men got into a personal controversy about property or about personal rights; they were to fight it out between themselves. The time was selected, the place was chosen, the judges were appointed, the arrangements all made; they fought, and the assumption of a mistaken piety was that God would give victory to the righteous, not to the strong. Even as late as 1819, a man arrested for crime in England flung down his glove upon the court-room floor and demanded wager of battle, and the court held that he was entitled to it; and on that provocation, the English Parliament abolished the right. The proposal for war is this, that what we have long since abolished as the method of settling controversies between individuals shall be maintained as the method of settling controversies between nations; they shall fight it out. It is based on “might makes right,” or at least on this, that only might can determine what is right. Some of us, and an increasing number, are prepared to affirm exactly the reverse, that right makes might, and that the method of settling controversies between nations, as between individuals, is to appeal to reason not to force.

I confess very frankly that I should not have come from New York to Boston in order to speak for international arbitration. We have had nearly eighty cases of international arbitration in the last century or less, and I do not think it necessary to argue at length in favor of that method. I stand to-night, with Edward Everett Hale, for a very different thing,—for the establishment of a permanent tribunal for the settlement of all questions that may arise between nation and nation, as we have a permanent tribunal which settles all questions that may arise between individual and individual. And the difference between these two propositions is very considerable. Arbitration is not arranged until the controversy has arisen, the blood is up, the passions are already hot, the question is formulated

and the sides are taken. When thus the controversy has arisen and the blood is hot and the passions are up, the court is constituted. And it is not a non-partisan, it is a bi-partisan, court;—and in New York some of us are very desirous of getting rid of bi-partisan tribunals of every kind! It is a bi-partisan tribunal: three members are appointed; one man is selected by one side, and of course he is in favor of that side; another man is selected on the other side and of course is in its favor, and these two select a third. Thus the court itself shares in a measure the prejudice of the parties, and feels the pulse and passion and fever-heat of the time. When this tribunal has settled the question, it has simply settled that one question, nothing else. It has no light thrown upon it by the precedents of the past, and it throws no light upon the future, by any precedent which it establishes. It does not determine what law is, it only determines what these two parties shall do or submit to have done. It determines a controversy, not a principle.

The permanent tribunal differs from temporary tribunals in every one of these respects. It is formed at a time when there is no controversy. The moment that the controversy arises, both the parties to it understand that this question is to be submitted to an impartial tribunal. When it comes before that tribunal, it comes before one as nearly impartial as it is possible to constitute, and when the tribunal has decided the question, it has decided not only that specific question but in deciding that it has decided a principle which shall solve future questions. The tribunal makes law in interpreting law.

What some of us, and an increasing number want, is a permanent international tribunal, to which, as a matter of course, every question arising between England and America shall be submitted, as every question arising between individual citizens in this State is submitted to the courts of Massachusetts, and every question arising between different States is submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States. What, would you submit a question of national honor to an international tribunal? Yes, I would submit a question of national honor to an international tribunal. Some of you are old enough to remember the time when men said, "You cannot submit a question of personal honor to a court. You must have duels to settle questions of personal honor." We have swept pistol and sword out of the way; questions of personal honor are no longer settled at the pistol's mouth, or at the sword point save in Germany. Is there a man here who counts his honor less safe, or the honor of his wife and his children less safe, because the duel has been abolished and the court put in its place? National honor would be safer in the hands of an international tribunal than in the hands of a passionate and fevered and partisan congress. Would you submit,—this question was recently put to me by a Senator of the United States,—a controversy affecting our national territory? If to-day France should come back saying, "You had no right to purchase Louisiana," would you submit that to an international tribunal? Why not? There is not a man in the United States who cannot file his claim against your house or mine, and an impartial tribunal will determine who is its rightful owner. If the question of territory had been dependent upon the judgment of an international tribunal, does any one imagine that Germany to-day would be holding under its clinched fist French Alsace and Lorraine? Yes, submit every question! For what we look forward to is the time, not so far distant either,

when armies shall exist only for police purposes; when there shall be so much navy as is needed to police the seas against the barbarians who pay no attention to law and order, and no more; and so much army as is necessary, so long as we have wild Indians upon our border,—to protect them from the wilder cow-boys.

Is this practicable? You have heard what Mr. Hale has read to you respecting the judgment of one of the first constitutional lawyers of Great Britain. We have a host of testimonies like that from this country. To go no further back, last June Edward Everett Hale put this doctrine of a permanent international tribunal, in the Lake Mohonk Conference, a great deal better than I am putting it now. And he was supported in the entire legal practicability of it by two of the most learned lawyers in the country,—my own brother, the dean of the New York University Law School, who has since gone from us, and Professor Thayer of the Harvard Law School. Two months later, Justice Brewer of the Supreme Court of the United States, at a meeting of the American Bar Association, where some of the ablest lawyers of the country were assembled, himself proposed a permanent tribunal for the settlement of international questions, and his proposal was received without dissent and with warm applause. A month later Mr. Chauncy M. Depew proposed the same thing before the New York Bar Association, and it was not only received with applause, but a committee was appointed to frame a plan and present it to the President; and this has since been done. And such an eminent jurist as Professor Cooley of Michigan University—than whom a more able authority in constitutional law does not exist in the country,—has declared emphatically that the plan is entirely within legal possibility.

How will you enforce the decisions of such a tribunal? How do we enforce the decisions of arbitration? Public opinion, Daniel Webster told us, nearly half a century ago, is a power; and it is a greater power now than it was then. How will England enforce the collection of the thousands of dollars due her under the recent arbitration decree? The moment it is determined how much is due her the public opinion of the United States will enforce payment for we will not have "Dishonored" written across our name. The public opinion of the great body of citizens is, after all, against war, if some better method of settlement and adjustment of controversies can be found. And the course of history, as well as the precepts of Jesus Christ, point to the method.

The question between war and law between the nations is precisely the same as the question between war and law between individuals. It is the question whether brute force or reason and conscience shall rule the world. We labor and look and pray and hope for a time when there shall be no more thought of war between nation and nation than there is to-day between individual and individual or between State and State, because we have agreed that justice, not might, shall rule the world. And so we inscribe upon our banner the motto of General Grant, our greatest warrior,—I do not think it is mere national pride which makes us think him the greatest general of our times,—“Let us have peace.”

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#### PROFESSOR PHELPS ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION.

Professor E. J. Phelps, in an article in the July *Atlantic Monthly*, states from the conservative point of



view the objections to a permanent court for the settlement of all issues between nations—a supreme court of Christendom, analogous to the Supreme Court of the United States. His objections may be briefly stated to be (1) that “an arbitration cannot extend the rules of international law beyond what is already established, since those rules find their only sanction and authority in the general consent of nations;” (2) “nor can it be expected that any controversy whatever which involves national honor will be submitted to arbitration by any nation capable of self-vindication;” (3) “that the same considerations will likewise prevent the reference to such a tribunal of any dispute involving the integrity of the territory of a nation;” (4) and, finally, that “in no case whatever can that remedy (arbitration) be successfully proposed where popular feeling on the one side or the other has reached fighting heat and has passed beyond the control of representative government.”

Anything which Professor Phelps writes on this subject is entitled to be treated with great respect by all readers of intelligence on both sides of the Atlantic. Nevertheless, we cannot but think that Professor Phelps' article shows more of the spirit of the lawyer than of the statesman; of the man who is governed by precedents than of the man who is guided by principles. There is danger, certainly, in the visionary who evolves an ideal out of his own imagination and then seeks to conform his practice or the practice of the community to this ideal. But there is also danger in the traditionalist who imagines that nothing can be which has not been, and measures all propositions for reform by historical precedents. The wise philosopher does neither; he considers the history of the past chiefly that he may learn from it what are the principles by which mankind should be guided and governed, and when he has elucidated these principles he applies them with unhesitating courage to new conditions. Thus, he perceives that a permanent tribunal has taken the place of wager of battle in the settlement of questions of personal and property rights; that public opinion has taken the place of the duel in the settlement of questions of personal honor; that the Supreme Court of the United States has taken the place of war in the settlement of controversies in this continent arising between over forty independent States; and, finally, that in the last century more than seventy-five different questions arising between different nations have been settled by appeal to courts of arbitration. From this history of the progress of the past he deduces the conclusion that the day is not far distant when all questions between nations will be settled by an appeal to reason, as now all questions between individuals are settled and all questions between the States of this Union.

To answer Professor Phelps' objections as briefly as we stated them: (1) An international tribunal would be the method of determining what is the general consent of nations, as now the State tribunal determines what is the general consent of individuals. (2) No question of national honor can be stated which would not better be solved by the appeal to reason than by the appeal to force of arms. (3) The integrity of national territory, regarded, as it ought to be, as a sacred trust, would be better protected by such an appeal than by the arbitrament of arms, which settles nothing but the relative force of the combatants. (4) And, finally, the creation of a permanent court, to which as a matter of course all issues arising should be referred, would prevent popular feeling from passing beyond the control of representative gov-

ernment exactly as it has prevented popular feeling from passing beyond such control, except in one instance, during the hundred years of our national existence.

It appears to us that Mr. Phelps has not acquainted himself even with the latest precedents. At least there is nothing in his article to indicate that he is aware of the fact that, within the last twelve months, France has, by the nearly unanimous action of its legislative chambers, proposed a permanent treaty of arbitration between that country and the United States; that negotiations are now pending between England and the United States for a permanent tribunal for the settlement of issues arising between those two nations; and that the International Parliamentary Conference, in which were members from fourteen different European Parliaments, has not only proposed to its respective Governments the organization of a permanent tribunal, but has formulated a plan for its organization. With these indications present before us, we ought not to go back one or two hundred years to determine what can be done in this close of the nineteenth century and this opening of the twentieth for the substitution of reason in the place of force as a means of settling questions of justice between the nations.—*The Outlook*.

#### OUR RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND.

The Venezuelan message of the President has brought forth a considerable movement among men of the best quality and purest motives, in behalf of some scheme of permanent international arbitration between the United States and Great Britain. The project has been much discussed, mainly by those to whom the theory seems attractive as a means of maintaining peace, but who probably have not reflected on its practical difficulties. It is not the most promising way to establish friendship, to begin to construct machinery to settle expected disputes. Nor is the occasion which has given rise to the proposal the most fortunate. It looks too much as if it were anticipated that we may find it desirable, in future political exigencies, to make similar attacks, and wish to secure ourselves beforehand against their being resented. But since the discussion is on the side of peace, it can do no harm, and will doubtless indirectly be productive of good.

Compulsory arbitration is a contradiction in terms, since that process must necessarily take place through a voluntary agreement, incapable of application until the occasion for it arises. To agree to arbitrate future controversies is one thing; actually to arbitrate an existing controversy is quite another. It is manifest that there must be many cases, quite impossible to foresee, to which such an agreement would not apply, or would be, by one side or the other, repudiated as inapplicable, and the question whether the case is within the agreement would be likely to make more trouble than the case itself. It might almost as well be hoped to prevent disputes by agreeing beforehand that we will never have them,—a practicable method, undoubtedly, if it could only be settled at the same time to what disputes the agreement not to dispute should apply.

But arbitration will still be resorted to in the future, as it has been in the past, in that limited class of international cases where the questions involved are questions of fact, depending for decision upon evidence. Such cases, while they may be compromised, can never be de-